

and their combinations in *Pr*. The figures are self-evident; but we must especially single out the colloquial ἀτάρ, δῆθεν, the Sicilian θήν, the adversative καίτοι, and the emphatic negatives οὐκουν . . . γε and οὐ (μή) δῆτα. Yet even in the case of those particles which appear sporadically in other Aeschylean plays, the high frequency in *Pr* is to be especially noted. Indeed, the frequency of ἦ μήν and οὐ δῆτα, together with the oft-repeated μάτην (also frequent in *Ag*), lends *Pr* a strangely asseverative style which seems unique among extant Aeschylean plays.

On the other side of the ledger, it should be noted that favorite Aeschylean expressions, like γε μὲν δῆ and τοι in choruses, are strangely

4. *Ibid.*, pp. lxviii, lxxviii, lxxxii. It may be added here that the statistics on Aeschylus' use of ἀλλά, ἄρα, ἄρα, γάρ, γε, δῆ,

missing from *Pr*. It would not need a scholar of Denniston's status to warn us repeatedly<sup>4</sup> how necessary it is to exercise caution in drawing conclusions about particles from the meager evidence of extant Greek literature at our disposal, especially on so difficult a terrain as the development of Aeschylus' style. Nonetheless, despite the ambiguity of our results, it would seem highly instructive to review the evidence we have in this comparative fashion, no matter what conclusion we may wish to draw about the authenticity of the *Prometheus Bound*.

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μὲν, νῦν, νῦν, οὕτως reveal nothing of significance for our investigation.

#### NOTES ON OVID *AMORES* 1. 3, HORACE *CARM.* 1. 14, AND PROPERTIUS 2. 26

Volume LXI (1966) of this journal contains papers on Ovid and Horace ("Desultores amoris: Ovid *Amores* 1. 3," by L. C. Curran, pp. 47 ff.; "Horace *Carm.* 1. 14," by W. S. Anderson, pp. 84 ff.) which, in my opinion, did much for our understanding of the poems dealt with, and to which I feel impelled to add some comments, together with some observations on Propertius 2. 26.

Mr. Curran in his paper on Ovid *Am.* 1. 3 rightly draws attention to the interplay between the words *eques* (8) and *desultor* (15). I also agree with his statement that "the *desultor amoris* without equal is of course Jupiter" (p. 49). But as regards Ovid's "admission of his equestrian background (8)," the poet's precise intention is to announce himself as being and acting better than his fellow equestrians, and he modestly ascribes the credit for this to poetry, and love poetry at that. C. may call it unoriginal, so far as the superiority of poetry to wealth is topical; he even may consider it insincerity. But I think this insincerity is no more than peripheral: it does not reveal the heart of the matter. In any event, he did much to further our understand-

ing of the *double-entendre*, so characteristic of the poet, which had not previously been fully elucidated.<sup>1</sup>

As C. observed, Ovid conspicuously uses the word *fides* three times (lines 6, 13, and 16). This underlines and explains his well-known keeping aloof from his order, and here, almost at the start of the collection, it is as it were programmatic.<sup>2</sup> We know that Ovid's father wished his son to enter a political career. We may fairly doubt that the son's refusal was based only on his sense of being a poet, since in the reign of Augustus for *equites* in particular it was easy to take up such a career; on the other hand, few would have the heart to voice their reluctance in this matter. Even Horace shrank from declining bluntly to become the political confidant of his Emperor, and Ovid certainly was far from being a Horace in Augustus' eyes. It is, therefore, only natural that Ovid concealed his intentions of keeping aloof in this respect. Now the connection between the repeated use of *fides* and the intimation of doing better than his fellow *equites* becomes more evident: more and more under Augustus the *equites* were abandoning

1. Cf. E. Ripert, *Ovide: "Les Amours"* (Paris, 1941), pp. 358-59.

2. It was written, I think, for the second edition, when Ovid had developed fully his masterly blending of political topics with innocent poetical motifs.

their traditional position. Only in times of emergencies could they be brought to stand by the holders of the *imperium*, as in the year of Cicero's consulship, in a more or less real *concordia ordinum*. But, as we know, the imperial monarchy, boasting of *consensus omnium*, got its most solid support from this very order.<sup>3</sup> That is why Ovid challenges, no less than three times, the *fides* of the *desultores* to whom, he announces, he does not wish to belong. In his autobiographical elegy he may, ironically, have ascribed this to his being by nature a poet, but we may better ascribe it to his distaste for the political atmosphere of the time (cf. *Tr.* 4. 10. 21–42, a passage culminating in the poet's admission of choosing his own gods!).

The poem now becomes a consistent whole. The poet is saying "love is my way of life ['all of life,' as Otis puts it<sup>4</sup>] and, even if this is only adoring from a poetical distance, it is the real present of heaven (1–4); I am ready to offer a *fides* which is a pure one (5–6); not a *fides* such as *equites* have to offer (7–8), nor the *fides* of the landowning senators (9–10); in fact, I am a love poet, which up to now has been a crime but which in my case is not (11–14); I am not a weathercock, no, my love is a constant one, and that is because I am a poet, not an ordinary *eques* (15–20). By the way, that reminds me of Jove who is the *desultor amoris* par excellence and who is thereby renowned, he and his several playmates (21–24), just as you and I will be forever (25–26)." *Iacta alea est*.

We may wonder why Jupiter is drawn into the picture. At first sight his inclusion seems to form an antithesis to Venus of line 4. On closer investigation, however, there appears to be more than this rather studied antithesis in matters of love. Though Ovid certainly could remember Jove in this connection in a casual manner, he was not that naïve. On the contrary, he was carefully building a climax

by proceeding from *equites* to senators and finally to Jupiter himself. The reader cannot here fail to recognize the Emperor, whose sexual behavior was the gossip of the time (see the account given with maliciously feigned aloofness in *Suet. Aug.* 69–71).<sup>5</sup> This is consistent with Ovid's way of comparing Augustus with Jupiter elsewhere; thus I need not labor the point. It is, furthermore, consistent with his keeping aloof from the *fides* of the régime, which Augustus so much wished to be publicized widely, as was done by Virgil and Horace for instance, those paladins of Augustan *uirtus* (see n. 5).

Precisely here, I think, is found the very personal blend of humor, irony, and sardonic candor, which caused Ovid's relegation. The last book of the *Metamorphoses*, especially the crowning portion from 15. 622 through the *laus Augusti*, must have been the last straw, as I have circumstantially pointed out elsewhere.<sup>6</sup> Here I would only draw attention to lines 821–28, on which my fellow countryman, Jan van Gelder, was the first, as far as I know, to comment thus: "With bewildering candor Ovid throughout this passage revives memories of events such as undoubtedly 'the Emperor Augustus' would have preferred to be relegated to limbo."<sup>7</sup>

Such was the *ingenium* that caused Ovid's exile: "ingenio perii Naso poeta meo" (*Tr.* 3. 74). Mr. Curran, I fear, did not go deeply enough into Ovid's double-bottomed poetry. As I have suggested elsewhere,<sup>8</sup> Ovid's motifs often are interwoven to the point of becoming inextricable, and in view of his mysterious exile it is tempting to try to disentangle the political as well as the social implications of his poems. Otis has done very well in calling attention to Ovid's reacting against hypocrisy.<sup>9</sup> This revulsion certainly motivated Ovid's choice of the themes on which he built his developments and variations. A born psychologist, if not yet a psychoanalyst, he chose

3. Cf. R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1952), pp. 354–55; P. Petit, *La Paix romaine* (Paris, 1967), pp. 267–71.

4. B. Otis, *Ovid as an Epic Poet* (Cambridge, 1966), p. 271.

5. This "desultorian" way of life of high society is openly exposed in *Am.* 3. 4. 37–40. That is why Ovid often caricatures the official appraisal of Roman virtues, as he does here in line 14 (*purpureusque pudor*).

6. A. W. J. Holleman, "Ovidii *Metamorphoseon* l. XV, 622–870 (Carmen et error?)," *Latomus*, XXVIII (1969), 42–60.

7. J. van Gelder, *Commentaar op P. Ovidius Naso-Bloemlezing* (The Hague-Brussels, 1967), p. 133.

8. *Op. cit.*, p. 60, n. 2.

9. Otis, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

love as the main theme, since it revealed hypocrisy eating its way into every cranny of the human heart. After having explored this theme in his erotic poetry he turned to mankind as a whole as a subject for such exploration, thus becoming a pioneer for later literature, for example that of Seneca *tragicus* and, above all, of Tacitus, who was obsessed by the hypocrisy of Roman society under the Caesars. Ovid was truly "a poet between two worlds," worlds which were crushing man, the one no less than the other.

I regret to end this discussion on a sad note, but thus was crushed out the life of the poet who rejected adopting the Horatian code, and who overstrained his poetical genius in order to delight and profit his readers.

With respect to the ingenious contribution of Mr. W. S. Anderson on Hor. *Carm.* 1. 14, I would call the author's attention to an interpretation of a fellow countryman of mine, C. P. Burger, Jr., published some forty years ago, that explains the Ode as referring to the love troubles of a friend of Horace, possibly the poet Ponticus.<sup>10</sup> On the whole I quite agree with A. and B. in reading the poem as an allegory of the Ship of Love, or more accurately the "Lover-Ship." All the same, as A. recognizes (cf. the "almost infinite possibilities for dealing with a highly elastic convention" p. 93), the metaphorical use of nautical imagery may easily lead to shifting, combining, even to confounding of underlying ideas. In this connection see Propertius 2. 26, where the poet dreams about a shipwreck which, in my opinion, is not so much the shipwreck of his *puella* as of his love. The start of the dream, however, makes it perfectly clear that it is about a girl (*mentita*, 3) who in loving words is addressed as *mea uita* (1). Up to line 17 (I follow the order of lines given by the manuscripts) there is little that is enigmatic about the dream. But thereafter commentators are at a loss concerning the role of the dolphin. Enk, in his 1927 edition, still printed E. Baehrens' (1880) transposition of lines 11–12

to follow the help (in this order unsuccessful) of the dolphin.<sup>11</sup> In his exhaustive Latin commentary of 1962, he is not altogether happy with the order of the lines as there restored. He has no explanation of his own to offer for the appearance of the dolphin simultaneously (*eo ipso temporis momento*) with the poet. The best he can do is to refer to Alfonsi's explanation: the poet did not wish to be second to the animal.<sup>12</sup>

Now a dream is a dream: it may strain reality and defy belief. But from these rather ridiculous presentations to the sublime imaginings of Propertius only one step is needed. Here, I think, a shift of the underlying ideas is taking place, and the poet himself, in *puto* (18), drops the clue to it: it must be the very dolphin that rescued the lyre of Arion, which signifies that by now it is his poetry itself that is in danger. This is indeed so, since the girl is the actual cause and support of Propertius' poetry as well as of the love for which he, like all elegists, is or wishes to be famous. But then it is obvious that he is ready for anything and everything in order to rescue the *puella* as well as his love, his poetry, and his life. As a matter of fact, he already had said so: in spite of all her infidelities (3), he had promised (*excepi*, 10)—perhaps (*tibi*) even compromised (like Catullus 68. 135–37)—all he could. Knowing what her confessions are worth, but feeling at the same time the voluptuous Glaucus in himself being mollified by the contrition of the beautiful girl and shifting his rising jealousy, quite aptly, to the Nereids (13–16), he, finally, is ready to leap into the waters, like a dolphin—that certain dolphin to which allusion has already been made.

In view of the foregoing I suggest that the simultaneousness of action (17–19) expresses a comparison which in a dream is impossible, quite "out of the picture." Moreover, in 2. 22. 41–42, Propertius had used parataxis for expressing comparison, and there the comparison is not in a dream. I would rather read, therefore, a comma or no punctuation at all at the end of line 18, in order to bring out

10. C. P. Burger, Jr., *Aere Perennius* (The Hague, 1926), pp. 86–92.

11. P. J. Enk, *Elegiaci Romani*<sup>2</sup> (Zutphen, 1927), pp. 173–75.

12. P. J. Enk, *Sex. Propertii Elegiarum liber secundus*, II (Leyden, 1962), 331–32.

the comparative meaning by stressing the simultaneousness of *iamque* (19).

For all these reasons the poem is no allegory. It is a dream, with the dreamer seeing from a poetical distance, so to say, what he experiences: his mistress' infidelities, her confessions, her contrition, his anger, his compassion, his voluptuous longings, his being a poet, a

Glaucus, a dolphin. . . In the last line it turns out to be a nightmare: the problem will come back, again and again. Poor masochistic Propertius—but how rich a poet!

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THE HAGUE

### LUCRETIUS, EPILEPSY, AND THE HIPPOCRATIC *ON BREATHS*

In his commentary on *De rerum natura* 3. 487–509 Heinze observes that Lucretius' account owes something to the medical writers, but does not seem quite to fit any medical work familiar to Heinze.<sup>1</sup> Heinze cites, of course, the Hippocratic *On the Sacred Disease* and a passage from pseudo-Galen. There is, however, another Hippocratic work which treats of epilepsy and which may have influenced Lucretius, namely the treatise *On Breaths* (*Περὶ φυχῶν*). This work is remarkable for its use of Gorgianic figures and sophistic rhetoric generally (hence its plausible date in the late fifth or early fourth centuries). Its style may have interested Lucretius the poet. The physical theory which it expounds, namely that all disease is due to the presence of air in the body, is not adopted by Lucretius;<sup>2</sup> but it is not necessarily in contradiction with Lucretius' views and is easily assimilable to his own theories of material causation: one may compare Lucretius' comparison of the soul to cloud or smoke in 3. 428, 436, 456. Like Lucretius, the author of *On Breaths* believes in a physical basis (in his case, air) for psychic phenomena.

But although Lucretius does not take over the general theory of *On Breaths*, there are indications that he has adapted to his own purposes (the proof of the mortality of the soul) some of the specific arguments and phraseology of the treatise.

Both in *On Breaths* 14 and Lucretius 3. 459 ff. there is a gradual progression from milder disorders of the soul to epilepsy. In both authors this progression contains the same three stages. Lucretius begins with the general illness of the soul during disease: delirium and lethargy (463–73). Next comes drunkenness (476–83) and, finally, epilepsy (484–509). *On Breaths* 14 tries to show that the blood, which is in turn affected by the air in the veins, determines the state of intelligence (*φρόνησις*). The first illustration is sleep: here the blood is chilled and the body becomes sluggish (VI, 112, Littré = p. 248. 10 ff. in W. H. S. Jones' edition<sup>3</sup>). Then comes drunkenness (248. 19 ff. Jones) and, finally, epilepsy (250. 31 ff. Jones = VI, 112, 114, Littré).

This general arrangement of the argument is the most striking and most important similarity between the two works. But there are also some smaller similarities of expression which gain a cumulative force when all the points are taken together.

Within the first division of the argument both authors stress the sluggishness of the body: "interdumque gravi lethargo fertur in altum / aeternumque soporem . . ." (465–66). *ψυχθέντι δὲ τῷ αἵματι νωθρότεροι γίνονται αἱ διέξοδοι. δῆλον δὲ. ῥέπει τὰ σώματα καὶ βαρύνεται* (248. 14–16 Jones). And it is perhaps worth juxtaposing Lucretius' *fertur in altum* / . . . *soporem* with the next statement of

1. R. Heinze, *T. Lucretius Carus, De rerum natura, Buch III* (Leipzig, 1897), p. 124: "... Kein Zweifel, dass er auch bei den nicht näher erörterten Symptomen das Gleiche annahm, die Epilepsie also als eine ursprünglich seelische Erkrankung ansah, die den Körper stark in Mitleidenschaft zieht. Das wird durch die uns bekannte medicinische Theorie einigermaßen gerechtfertigt, obwohl uns meines Wissens nichts vorliegt, was sich mit der von L. befolgten genau deckte."

2. At 3. 503, in fact, Lucretius speaks of the *acer corrupti corporis umor*, which would seem to bring his pathology closer to the Hippocratic *On the Sacred Disease*, with its stress on the role of phlegm and bile.

3. The text of the *On Breaths* cited is that of W. H. S. Jones, *Hippocrates*, LCL (London, 1923), II. The text of Lucretius cited is that of C. Bailey's *editio maior* (Oxford, 1947), I.